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3 October 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Presidential Briefing Coordinator

SUBJECT : Preparations for Wednesday, 4 October, Meeting
with NIOs on Arms Control Monitoring

1. Attached are the latest tables on Arms Control Monitoring. These tables will be the subject of tomorrow's meeting. I have asked Howie Stoertz to serve as moderator although his expertise does not span all of the negotiations under discussion. Indeed, no one is expert on all of them. Hence my greatest concern is the validity of cross-negotiation comparisons. The most important and difficult cross-negotiation comparison is the "Relative Threat" column. I recommend that the meeting focus on it. However, there are a number of lesser concerns that need to be voiced in order to satisfy all interested parties that they have had their day in court. In order to do this expeditiously so as to be able to get on with the meat of the discussion I propose an opening scenario below.

2. Procedurally I recommend

a. You open the meeting with a brief statement of the purpose of this exercise along the following lines:

- (1) 25X1
- (a) Indicate problem areas
 - (b) Anticipate weaknesses in Agreements
 - (c) Show impact of verification
 - (d) Bolster collection needs

(2) Bring out issues for policymakers
- Prepare for testimony on Hill

(3) Resolve Community disagreements

b. Howie then chime in with a statement to set the theme along the following lines:

- (1) Intent of charts is to display agreements under consideration
- Recognize data compressed but magnitude of treaties force need to focus
- Charts are only coordinated within NFAC; need to go to Intelligence Community, but, are we ready?
- (2) Specific NFAC areas of concern on Monitoring Chart: 25X1
- (a) Minor

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- Because negotiations are on-going charts should be updated prior to each use
- Compression of information could be misleading; recommend distribution should be limited to DCI to prevent misuse.

(b) Significant

- "Uncertainty" levels of E have not been addressed by the Community before
- Conceptually we can do it, but will take some hard work

(c) Major - concern for comparability of data across negotiations

- "Relative Threat" column is the tool to do this, but
- It is difficult to evaluate, all indicators are highly judgmental
- Some risk of going outside the bounds of intelligence into the policy arena

c. Then you note something to the effect,

- Appreciate the difficulty and delicacy of this, but
- Essential that we put the various weaknesses into perspective
- So let's talk in detail about what these assessments mean

d. Hopefully we will then focus on a discussion of the Relative Threat column with each expert contributing his view of what the numbers mean in his field.

3. Because our SALT work is so far ahead of our work for other negotiations, there is a risk that we will focus too much on SALT. I recommend we strive to force our discussion to cover all negotiations.



25X1A

Attachments

cc: DD/NFA
NIO/SP

Relative Threat Key

This column is intended to compare a weakness noted in one agreement relative to a weakness in another agreement. It was included to put into perspective the significance of an event occurring since some distinction should be made when comparing all arms control agreements. Thus it should provide a gauge as to what threat each category would pose to the US if we were unable to monitor the agreement as noted. The assessment by necessity is judgmental. For example, a major build-up of forces has been evaluated as a "severe" threat; a low-yield underground explosion on the other hand is evaluated as a "low" threat.

More specifically a definition of the Relative Threat Assessment numbers might be something like,

These highly judgmental numbers represent a ranking of the threat to United States security if

- (1) A large-scale systematic violation is perpetrated,
- (2) The violation is undetected,
- (3) US military and foreign policy continued for a long period of time on the assumption that the agreement was being fully honored, and
- (4) Our enemies opted to use their additional capability in the way which they see as most damaging to the US.